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41 
THE PRIDE OF THE COMMON LAW: OKLAHOMA’S 
STRUGGLE WITH THE PRIMA FACIE TORT ACTION 
Matthew C. Kane* 
Ivan L. London** 
  
“From a mere glance at the photograph of it as it appears in the record, it is very evident 
that [the wall on defendant's said premises in close proximity to said line, and within six 
or eight inches of the west wall of plaintiff's said flat building] serves no useful, needful, 
or ornamental purpose, and that it was built some six or seven years ago, and ever since 
has been maintained out of pure malice and spite.” Kane, J., Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 P. 
1158, 1160 (Okla. 1916). Original photograph from the court file.   
*Matthew C. Kane is a visiting assistant professor at the University of Oklahoma 
College of Law and a partner at the law firm of Ryan Whaley Coldiron Jantzen Pe-
ters & Webber.  
** Ivan L. London is a 2008 graduate of the University of Oklahoma and an attorney 
in the Denver Colorado office of Bryan Cave. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, two Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals opinions reached wholly divergent 
conclusions on the viability of the “prima facie tort” theory of recovery in Oklahoma.1 
Subsequently, some thirteen federal district court and two state court of civil appeals opin-
ions have cited one of these two opinions (with very little focus on the prima facie tort 
issue), though none have cited both cases. To date, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not 
yet resolved the disagreement. The federal district court, providing the only substantive 
treatment, has acknowledged the unsettled nature of Oklahoma treatment of the tort: 
At a minimum, there is uncertainty regarding the continued viability of 
the tort of malicious wrong under Oklahoma law. Accordingly, the 
Court cannot say, as Blatnick asks the Court to do, that plaintiffs have 
no possibility of recovery against her. An Oklahoma court is more 
properly suited to decide unsettled issues of Oklahoma law.2 
Given this open question, we analyze the existence of the prima facie tort under 
Oklahoma law. This paper begins with an overview of the development of the tort, with a 
focus on the foremost American proponent of the proposition, the esteemed Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes. In Part II, we examine the historic application of the tort in the Oklahoma 
courts. Part III addresses the divergent opinions produced by the Oklahoma Civil Court of 
Appeals and, in particular, critiques the Tarrant opinion and its determination that the tort 
does not lie in Oklahoma. Part IV reviews the application of the tort in other jurisdictions. 
We conclude with our contention that Oklahoma has adopted the prima facie tort and sug-
gest that it plays a useful but limited role in Oklahoma litigation. 
II. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & INTENTIONAL TORT THEORY 
Justice Holmes walked to the beat of his own drum; with a keen intellect and sharply 
honed wit, he was ripe for any challenge. “What is it? Tell me, I’ll take the opposite side,” 
he would offer.3 He became known as the “Great Dissenter” for his refusal to conform to 
the prevailing views of other members of the Supreme Court—“How could he help dis-
senting, he asked, when the Supreme Court rendered such illiberal decisions?”4 As the 
years passed, he maintained his sense of humor. During an interview on his ninetieth birth-
day, he quoted Virgil:  “Death plucks my ear and says, Live – I am coming.”5 Another 
day, while on a walk with a friend, he passed a young woman on the street and sighed, 
“Ah, George, what wouldn’t I give to be seventy-five again.”6 
Justice Holmes’ legal pronouncements were every bit as thoughtful as his quips 
amusing. Among his many contributions to modern jurisprudence was his conception of a 
                                                          
 1. Compare Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 241 P.3d 280 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010), with Fulton v. 
People Lease Corp., 241 P.3d 255 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010), cert. denied, (May 17, 2010). 
 2. Rollins v. Blatnick, No. 14-CV-46-JED-PJC, 2014 WL 1466487, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 15, 2014). 
 3. Time Magazine, Books: The Great Dissenter, May 8, 1944, available at http://www.time.com/time/mag-
azine/article/0,9171,933394,00.html (last visited January 19, 2016) (discussing Catherine Drinker Brown, 
YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS – JUSTICE HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY (1944)). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. J. CRAIG WILLIAMS, Forward to OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW AND THE COMMON 
LAW, p. ix (2008) (quoting Isaac Asimov, THE SENSUOUS DIRTY OLD MAN (1971). 
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tripartite scheme that segregated intentional, negligent and strict liability torts.7 Justice 
Holmes first articulated his general theory of “intentional tort” in an 1894 Harvard Law 
Review article titled Privilege, Malice, and Intent.8 Specifically, Justice Holmes opined 
that “the intentional infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely 
to inflict such damage and inflicting it, is actionable if done without just cause.”9 Justice 
Holmes clearly recognized that “[t]he right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s 
nose begins.”10 
The precise genesis of Justice Holmes’ prima facie theory is unknown. Perhaps, as 
a young officer in the Civil War, he was influenced by a man he was rumored to have 
warned of incoming gunfire at Fort Stevens: “[G]et down you damn fool, before you get 
shot,” he yelled to President Abraham Lincoln.11 President Lincoln, after all, had pro-
claimed, “[H]e cannot say that people have a right to do wrong.”12 Alternatively, maybe 
Justice Holmes’ love for Plato swayed him—President Franklin D. Roosevelt once caught 
92-year-old Justice Holmes reading Plato to “improve [his] mind.”13 
Certainly, his long-time friendship with Sir Frederick Pollack was essential to the 
development of his legal philosophy. The two met when Holmes was travelling in England 
in 1874 and regularly corresponded thereafter. Despite Holmes’ critical contributions to 
the development of the prima facie tort, Pollack first clearly articulated the principle in 
1887, stating the existence of “a general proposition of English law that it is wrong to do 
wilful harm to one’s neighbour without justification or excuse.”14 In articulating his own 
theory, Holmes reached a similar conclusion (quoted above), predicated on two primary 
cases: Walker v. Cronin,15 and Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor.16 In the former, a case 
involving the inducement of a shoe manufacturer’s craftsmen by a competitor, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court stated: “The intentional causing of such loss to another, without 
justifiable cause, and with the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of itself a wrong.”17 Simi-
larly, in the latter, a shipping association worked to underbid the competition and threat-
ened to pull all business from agents who did not act exclusively for the association. In 
that instance, Lord Justice Bowen stated: “Now intentionally to do that which is calculated 
                                                          
 7. E.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of A General Theory of Inten-
tional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 448 (1990).  Professor Vandevelde’s article provides a thorough history 
of the “general theory of intentional tort” and describes in detail the evolution of Justice Holmes’ promotion of 
“prima facie tort” as a theory of recovery. 
 8. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894); Vandevelde, supra 
note 7, at 472. 
 9. Holmes, supra note 8, at 3. 
 10. HOLMES, supra note 6, at vii. 
 11. JAMES A. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 757 (1988). 
 12. Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply to Judge Douglas in the Seventh and Last Debate. Alton, Illinois. 
October 15, 1858, SPEECHES AND LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 155 (2006). 
 13. Books: The Great Dissenter, supra note 3. However, a strict adherence to Plato’s teachings would suggest 
there could be no justification of a wrong at all. Plato, “Crito,” DIALOGUES OF PLATO, 1900, 
http://ota.ox.ac.uk/desc/1941 (last visited January 19, 2016) (“Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do 
wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil 
and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? . . .  Yes.  Then we 
must do no wrong?  Certainly not.”).   
 14. Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 472 (quoting F. Pollock, THE LAW OF TORTS IX 22 (1894)). 
 15. 107 Mass. 555 (Mass. 1871).   
 16. 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1889), aff’d [1892] A.C. 25. 
 17. 107 Mass. at 562. 
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in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that 
person’s property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.”18 
The lynchpin of Justice Holmes’ theory of intentional tort was “justification” or “just 
cause” for intentionally causing harm.19 Importantly, Justice Holmes did not design his 
proposition of a “general theory of intentional tort” to expand the universe of tort recov-
ery.20 For Justice Holmes, the general theory of intentional tort, which became the theory 
of liability for “prima facie tort,” was a straw man for his focus on the role of legislators 
in defining the law and the role of judges in applying the law.21 In other words, Justice 
Holmes paired his capacious view of liability with a nearly equally broad view of statutory 
“justification” in order to discourage “activist” judges from legislating from the bench.22 
Justice Holmes anchored his potentially expansive “intentional tort” in malice. His 
investigation and delineation of malice revealed the true nature of his tort theory: a judge 
must be limited by the policy justifications pronounced by the legislature, but cannot let a 
defendant cause intentional harm to another while hiding behind the shield of “justifica-
tion” or “privilege.”23 In order to define the bounds of justification, Justice Holmes needed 
a definition of malice that he could actually apply. Accordingly, he did not define malice 
merely as an absence of justification.24 Instead, Justice Holmes defined malice as malev-
olence. Specifically, he defined “malice” as “a malevolent motive for action, without ref-
erence to any hope of a remoter benefit to oneself to be accomplished by the intended harm 
to another.”25 A defendant who acted malevolently could have also acted in a manner that 
was justified. In other words, Justice Holmes revealed that his primary motive was to write 
into law the common-sense notion that a defendant cannot act with the sole intention of 
hurting another and then seek the protection of some idiosyncratic statutory justification 
or privilege. To the contrary, if a defendant acts with the sole purpose of harming the 
plaintiff and succeeds, then the defendant violates the duty he owes to the plaintiff—in-
deed, to every person. We should hold him accountable. Malicious motives could make a 
lawful act unlawful. 
As evidenced in Privilege, Malice, and Intent, Justice Holmes’ primary policy con-
cern was to define the socially acceptable bounds of injury to economic interests caused 
by trade unions and business competitors.26 The business competition forum also called 
                                                          
 18. 23 Q. B. D. at 613; see also, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUMBIA L. REV. 503, 503 (1952).  
Ultimately, the court determined that no cause of action existed as the association’s actions were not unlawful. 
 19. Holmes, supra note 8, at 3. 
 20. See generally Holmes, supra note 8, at 3; Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 449. 
 21. Holmes, supra note 8, at 3 (“[W]hether, and how far, a privilege shall be allowed is a question of policy.  
Questions of policy are legislative questions, and judges are shy of reasoning from such grounds . . .When the 
question of policy is faced it . . . must be determined by the particular character of the case.”). 
 22. Holmes, supra note 8, at 3; Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 458. 
 23. Holmes, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 476;  See generally Holmes, supra note 8.  In that way, the development of 
Justice Holmes’ intentional tort theory mirrored the rise of negligence as a means of shielding corporations from 
liability for the accidental injuries to their employees and customers.  Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 484. 
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forth Justice Holmes’ most enduring opinion in promotion of prima facie tort—the Su-
preme Court case Aikens v. Wisconsin.27 In Aikens, a Milwaukee newspaper publisher de-
cided to raise the price for advertising by twenty-five percent. In response, the managers 
of competing newspapers agreed not to raise their advertising prices, but they also agreed 
to charge the higher price to any advertiser if that advertiser paid the higher price to the 
price-raising competitor. In that way, they would discourage advertisers from placing ads 
in the competitor’s newspaper.28 The State of Wisconsin, however, had promulgated a 
statute making it a crime for any two or more persons to “combine . . . for the purpose of 
wilfully or maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business, or profession.”29 
The state prosecuted the colluders and obtained a conviction. The defendants appealed the 
conviction to the United States Supreme Court because the criminal-collusion statute vio-
lated their right to contract under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.30 
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, affirmed the conviction and upheld the 
criminal-collusion statute.31 In doing so, he seized on the mens rea wording of the statute—
“wilfully or maliciously”—to introduce his conception of “malice” not only as an absence 
of justification but also as a negation of justification.32 Justice Holmes readily conceded 
that he could not punish “wilfull” combinations on that ground alone.33 “Wilfull” combi-
nation alone would encompass too much justified activity (e.g., forming a partnership for 
competing in business with the clear intent that successful business practices would accrue 
benefit to the partnership and financial harm to its competitors) to form the basis of crim-
inal liability.34 However, Justice Holmes upheld the statute because if the defendants had 
acted “maliciously,” then their malevolence toward the plaintiff would negate the justifi-
cation for their intentional acts.35 
In dicta—after all, the Supreme Court was reviewing the constitutionality of a crim-
inal statute—Justice Holmes opined that the defendants’ conduct would have resulted in 
civil liability under his version of the common law prima facie tort.36 The colluders acted 
maliciously, which Justice Holmes interpreted as “malevolently, for the sake of the harm 
as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some further end legitimately desired.”37 
For Justice Holmes, when intentional acts “done maliciously” or “malevolently” result in 
injury, the power to punish those acts cannot be denied on the grounds that the conduct 
                                                          
 27. 195 U.S. 194 (1904). 
 28. Id. at 202. 
 29. Id. at 201-02. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 204. 
 32. Aikens, 195 U.S. at 203-04.   
 33. Id. at 202-03 (“If it should be construed literally, the word ‘wilfully’ would embrace all injuries intended 
to follow the parties’ acts, although they were intended only as the necessary means to ulterior gain for them-
selves.”). As Justice White’s short dissent notes, Holmes perhaps impermissibly read into the Wisconsin law a 
conjunctive—i.e., that the combination had to be “wilfull and malicious” despite the statutory text’s disjunctive 
“wilfull or malicious”—based on an “intimation” by the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the narrower conjunctive 
version was correct. Id. at 207 (White, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 203. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 204. 
 37. Aikens, 195 U.S. at 203. 
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would have been lawful but for the malicious intent.38 “No conduct has such an absolute 
privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part.”39 If the defendants’ 
malicious intent in Aikens warranted the state’s prosecution, then a civil defendant’s ma-
licious intent should give rise to civil liability as well. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts follows the derivation of Justice Holmes’ prima 
facie tort theory. Section 870 states: 
One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to 
the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not jus-
tifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although 
the actor’s conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort 
liability.40 
The Restatement version of prima facie tort deviates from Justice Holmes’ theory 
where it fails to state that malice can negate justification. Instead, it focuses on a balancing 
of interests in determining the applicability of the tort. 
The determination of which ones should be the subject of tort liability is 
made by resorting to the balancing process described above and ana-
lyzed in more detail below. For negligence and strict liability it is a one-
step process, and a single phrase is used to describe the test. For inten-
tional torts, it is a two-step process. The requirements are worked out 
both for a prima facie tort and for a privilege amounting to an excuse or 
justification.41 
It enumerates the following factors for consideration in the balancing analysis: (1) 
the nature and seriousness of the harm to the injured party, (2) the nature and significance 
of the interests promoted by the actor’s conduct, (3) the character of the means used by the 
actor and (4) the actor’s motive.42 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has appeared several times in Oklahoma’s prima 
facie tort jurisprudence, but until recently, § 870 has not played a central role.43 
 
 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 205-06. 
 39. Id. at 206. 
 40. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 (1979).   
 41. Id. at cmt. e. 
 42. Id. See also, STUART SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AND ALFRED GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS, 
§ 35:6 (2012). 
 43. The following cases, which are relevant to Oklahoma’s prima facie tort jurisprudence, have mentioned § 
870: Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 862 n.17 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an 
argument that § 870 creates a tort claim for spoliation of evidence in Oklahoma); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 335 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e need not further speculate about 
the vitality of prima facie tort in Oklahoma because, even assuming that Oklahoma would recognize the tort, 
Cardtoons’ claim would fail . . . to prevail at common law on a theory of prima facie tort, a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant’s conduct was ‘generally culpable and not justified under the circumstances . . . Cardtoons has 
not shown that by sending the letter MLBPA acted maliciously or wrongfully or that MLBPA’s actions were not 
privileged, justified, or excusable.”) (internal citations omitted); Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. 
Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2000); Merrick v. N. Natural Gas Co., Div. of Enron 
Corp., 911 F.2d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1990); Obsolete Ford Parts v. Ford Motor Co., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 
n.3 (W.D. Okla. 2004); Tarrant, 2010 OK CIV APP 82. 
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III. “PRIMA FACIE TORT” AND THE TORT OF “MALICIOUS WRONG” IN OKLAHOMA 
JURISPRUDENCE. 
Justice Holmes intended his prima facie tort theory to move the focus of tort juris-
prudence away from the injury, towards the plaintiff’s rights, and onto the breach of a 
legislatively defined duty by the defendant.44 Thus, he viewed tort law as a government-
imposed set of duties requiring actors to avoid injuries to others. In 1910, the Oklahoma 
legislature adopted a concept of duty-based tort when it promulgated a set of tort laws 
anchored by the directive, “Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injur-
ing the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights.”45 Another 
contemporaneously enacted statute furthered the concept: “Any person who suffers detri-
ment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a 
compensation therefore in money, which is called damages.”46 Notably, despite the fre-
quent and often sweeping reforms to various Oklahoma statutory schemes, the Oklahoma 
Legislature has not altered these provisions. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first addressed the concept of general intentional tort 
in a 1916 case involving rather colorful facts.47 The plaintiff had constructed a multi-story 
apartment complex on Okmulgee Avenue in Muskogee, Oklahoma. His neighbor was ap-
parently displeased with the development and built a solid brick wall on the very edge of 
his property, effectively blocking any light or breeze from entering the twelve windows 
on that side of the apartment building. Evidence at the trial established that he had con-
structed the wall “without advantage to himself and without intention to benefit himself in 
any legal manner . . . for the sole purpose of injuring the [apartment owner] in and about 
the use and occupation of his property.”48 In a unanimous opinion affirming the lower 
court’s decision in favor of the apartment owner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court deter-
mined, “The wanton infliction of damage can never be a right. It is a wrong, and a violation 
of right, and is not without remedy.”49 Indeed, in a case replete with references to the 
common law, the Court noted: “[i]t has always been the pride of the common law that it 
permitted no wrong with damage, without a remedy.”50 The Court continued: “[N]o man 
                                                          
 44. Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 466; Holmes, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
 45. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 1 (West 2001). 
 46. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3 (West). In Stebbins v. Edwards, 224 P. 714, 715 (Okla. 1924), the Okla-
homa Supreme Court relied on this statute and Schonwald v. Ragains, 122 P.203, 203 (Okla. 1912) (finding “an 
actionable tort for one to maliciously interfere with a contract between two parties and induce one of them to 
break that contract to the injury of the other”) to permit an action where the injury sustained by a person’s busi-
ness [was] by means of false and malicious statements and representations made by the defendants for such 
purpose and with the intention of destroying such person’s established business.  
 47. Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 P. 1158 (Okla. 1916). 
 48. Id. at 1159. 
 49. Id. at 1160 (quoting Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (Mich. 1888)).   
 50. The Burke case expounds eloquently on the breadth of courts’ ability to enforce rights and duties through 
a general scheme of intentional torts: “The right to breath the air, and to enjoy the sunshine, is a natural one; and 
no man can pollute the atmosphere, or shut out the light of heaven, for no better reason than that the situation of 
his property is such that he is given the opportunity of so doing, and wishes to gratify his spite and malice towards 
his neighbor. It is said that the adoption of statutes in several of the states making this kind of injury actionable 
shows that the courts have no right to furnish the redress . . . It has always been the pride of the common law that 
it permitted no wrong with damage, without a remedy. In all the cases where [intentional] injuries have occurred, 
proceeding alone from the malice of the defendant, it is held to be a wrong accompanied by damage.” Burke, 37 
N.W. at 842. 
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can pollute the atmosphere or shut out the light of heaven for no better reason than that the 
situation of his property is such that he is given the opportunity of so doing, and wishes to 
gratify his spite and malice toward his neighbor.”51 
Some seven years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court encountered a set of facts so 
extraordinary as to make malicious wall-building seem mundane.52 The mayor of 
Mangum, who also happened to be a full-time physician, was supporting a bond issue to 
construct a local power plant to service the city. Existing providers were not thrilled at the 
prospect and entered into a complex conspiracy to discredit the mayor. The first step in 
the master plan was to find a pregnant woman willing to undergo an illegal abortion. The 
second, to employ a woman to pose as the pregnant woman’s mother—the conspirators 
determined that the mayor “would not commit the offense solely for a money considera-
tion, but might be induced to do so if the purported mother would make a sympathetic 
appeal to the plaintiff.”53 When the prospective mother withdrew from the conspiracy, the 
defendants decided to move forward with a younger woman who would pose as a sister. 
To ensure the mayor’s compliance, the defendants engaged a former minister who was 
acquainted with the mayor to tell the mayor “under the circumstances it would be a Chris-
tian act to perform the operation.”54 Finally, the defendants employed a detective agency 
to install a dictagraph in the hotel where the mayor would meet with the pregnant woman 
and presumably conduct the abortion. When the first meeting did not materialize, they 
installed additional dictagraphs in other hotels in various cities. There was just one prob-
lem—the mayor had a member of the conspiracy on his payroll. When the conspirators 
arrived for the meeting, the mayor had them arrested and initiated litigation.55 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the defendants’ actionable wrong 
was not their conspiracy to commit an illegal abortion or to slander the mayor, but rather 
their attempts to “willfully and maliciously . . . injure plaintiff in his business and profes-
sion, and in his official capacity by willful, malicious, and corrupt means . . . without just 
cause or excuse.”56 The Court found an action existed for “[t]he intentional doing of those 
acts which are intended to, and in fact do, damage another in his property or profession.”57 
The Court then defined a “malicious wrong” as “[t]he intentional doing of that which is 
calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage 
another, or that other person’s property or trade . . . if done without just cause or excuse.”58 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again addressed the “prima facie” tort theory in Ward 
v. First National Bank.59 The plaintiff was a veteran with significant competency issues 
who filed suit because a court appointed guardian limited the amount of money he could 
draw from a trust fund established to care for him in light of his wartime disability. The 
Supreme Court quoted Magnum for the proposition that “[t]he intentional doing of that 
                                                          
 51. Id.  
 52. Mangum Elec. Co. v. Border, 222 P. 1002 (Okla. 1923). 
 53. Id. at 1006. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1004-05. 
 57. Mangum, 222 P.  at 1005. 
 58. Id. 
 59. 1937 OK 449, 69 P.2d 1041.   
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which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, 
damage another, or that other person’s property or trade is actionable, if done without just 
cause or excuse.”60 Because there was “sufficient cause” to institute the guardianship pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court.61 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California v. Tetirick was decided the 
next year.62 In that case, a patient recovering from a nervous breakdown in a hospital at-
tempted to obtain insurance benefits for his injury. Against the advice of the patient’s phy-
sician and with knowledge of his condition, an agent for the insurer entered into the pa-
tient’s room and demanded he cancel the policy. The agent “attempted intimidation and 
threats, paced up and down in the room, and talked loudly, and in a boisterous and ob-
streperous manner.”63 “[O]n account of [Plaintiff’s] physical and nervous condition the 
actions of defendant were seriously harmful to him and caused a serous relapse, destroying 
or delaying his chance for recovery, and rendered him totally and permanently disabled 
physically.”64 Without citing to a single case or any other authority, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court provided several conditions which could be met for the plaintiff to establish 
a cause of action, including proof that the defendant “acted with such malice toward plain-
tiff as would indicate a conclusion to so act in disregard of whatever damage might be 
occasioned thereby.”65 
In Patel v. OMH Medical Center, the Oklahoma Supreme Court again discussed the 
prima facie tort. Justice Opala noted, “[t]he expression ‘prima facie tort’ does not appear 
to ever have been recognized in Oklahoma.”66 Justice Opala did not expressly state that 
such a tort was wholly unavailable, but rather acknowledged the semantics of Oklahoma 
tort law, which alone appears insufficient to rule out prima facie tort as a theory of recov-
ery in Oklahoma. Instead, Justice Opala noted that the Tenth Circuit had determined that 
“the concept of prima facie tort has been applied in Oklahoma jurisprudence under limited 
circumstances.”67 
Relying on a number of historical Oklahoma cases, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has tentatively acknowledged the existence of a “prima facie tort” theory of liability 
in Oklahoma.68 The Tenth Circuit, however, narrowly construed the scope of the tort, re-
stricting its application to business and property interests, which were often the focus of 
the older cases, notwithstanding the lack of limiting language in those cases and absence 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 1043 (quoting Magnum, 222 P. at 1005). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California v. Tetirick, 89 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1938).   
 63. Id. at 775. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 774.  Justice Davidson complained that the majority opinion “should contain a more thorough dis-
cussion of the issues,” and engaged in a more detailed analysis.  He relied in part on Mangum Electric.  Id. at 
776.  He noted:  “[W]here the cause of action arises from conduct which is not unlawful in itself, then both a 
malicious intent and a material detriment must be shown, though the malice may be implied from the circum-
stances surrounding such conduct.”  Id. at 781. 
 66. Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1190 n.2 (Okla. 1999).   
 67. Id. (citing Merrick). 
 68. Merrick, 911 F.2d at 433. Cf. Cardtoons, L.C., 335 F.3d at 1167-68 (refusing to make a determination of 
whether Oklahoma courts have acknowledged the prima facie tort theory of liability); National Ass’n of Profes-
sional Baseball Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1151. 
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of any other limitation in Oklahoma law.69 Indeed, the Rollins court specifically noted that 
“Fulton[70] . . . undermines the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Merrick . . . that Oklahoma 
would likely not recognize the tort in an employment context.”71 Accordingly, there is no 
basis for adopting the Tenth Circuit’s limitation on prima facie tort into Oklahoma law. 
With such limited and somewhat conflicting direction, it is unsurprising that sound 
legal minds, focused on applying precedent, could reach different or opposite conclusions. 
IV. RECENT DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS 
On May 17, 2010, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, First Division, issued the 
opinion in Fulton v. People Lease Corp. The court explicitly acknowledged the existence 
of prima facie tort.72 Consistent with Justice Opala’s comment in Patel, the Court of Civil 
Appeals did not call the theory of recovery “prima facie tort” but rather employed the 
“malicious wrong” terminology.73 Reaching back to Mangum Electric, Hibbard, Schon-
wald, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 (1979), the Court of Civil Appeals deter-
mined that a malicious wrong theory of recovery existed under Oklahoma law.74 Moreo-
ver, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the theory of recovery was available in the 
context of an employment discrimination cause of action75—the same type of case the 
Tenth Circuit had determined would fall outside Oklahoma’s prima facie tort cause of 
action.76 While not explicitly addressing the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion, Fulton appears to 
recognize that the prima facie tort is not limited to harm to property and business but rather 
applies the Restatement’s broader prohibition against malicious injuries to “another.”77 
On July 27, 2010, the Court of Civil Appeals, Second Division, issued an opinion in 
Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, which explicitly rejected the existence of a prima 
facie tort.78 It did not address the Fulton opinion, any of the historic cases, or the Restate-
ment,79 only noting that the Tenth Circuit had recognized the tort but had essentially 
                                                          
 69. See Merrick, 911 F.2d at 433. Myers v. Knight Protective Serv., Inc., No. CIV-10-866-C, 2011 WL 39039, 
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 2011) relies on Merrick (and no other source or analysis) to conclude that the tort of 
malicious wrong is not available in “an employment context.” 
 70. 241 P.3d 255 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (discussed in detail infra).   
 71. Rollins, 2014 WL 1466487, *2. 
 72. Fulton, 241 P.3d 255.  Judge Hetherington wrote the opinion, Judge Hansen concurred, and Judge Buett-
ner concurred in part and dissented in part (without explanation).  The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied both 
parties’ requests for certiorari on May 17, 2010, by an 8-0 majority (Justice Reif not voting). 
 73. Id. at 265-267. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Merrick, 911 F.2d at 433. 
 77. Fulton, 241 P.3d at 266. 
 78. Tarrant v. Guthrie First Capital Bank, 241 P.3d 280 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). Judge Fischer wrote the 
opinion, and Judges Wiseman and Barnes concurred. The parties did not seek certiorari from the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court.  
 79. Id. at 283. The Court of Civil Appeals also noted several of its unpublished cases reached similar conclu-
sions. Id. at 283 n.6 (citing Langlee v. ONEOK, Inc., Case No. 99,806, slip op. at 4 (March 30, 2004) (“Oklahoma 
has not recognized prima facie tort actions . . . Recognition of such a cause of action rests not with this Court 
acting as an error correcting Court, but rather with this State’s Supreme Court.”); Selby v. Mid-Continent Cas. 
Co., Case No. 101,214, slip op. at 4-5 (March 29, 2005) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not recognized 
either spoliation of evidence or prima facie tort actions.”); Toolpushers Supply Co. v. Kris Agrawal, Case No. 
101,163, slip op. at 10-11 (August 29, 2006) (“Last, [plaintiff’s] assertion that the trial court failed to recognize 
a ‘prima facie claim for deceit’ in the counterclaim has no merit . . . Oklahoma has not recognized prima facie 
tort actions . . . Recognition of such a cause of action rests with the Supreme Court.”)). 
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reached its conclusion by relying on a “student” Oklahoma Bar Journal article.80 The Court 
of Civil Appeals concluded that Patel was instructive:  
  
 Although Patel does not specifically hold that the prima facie tort the-
ory of recovery is unavailable in any other circumstances, it certainly 
did so with respect to the facts before the Court in that case. Nonetheless, 
until the Supreme Court expressly adopts the prima facie tort theory of 
recovery, we are unwilling to do so.81 
 
Tarrant’s holding is clearly predicated on its conclusion that it will not “adopt” a 
prima facie tort theory until the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly does so. However, 
this is simply not the correct analysis. Even ignoring the abundance of prior Oklahoma 
case law, the Tarrant court should have asked whether the prima facie tort theory was a 
part of the common law before statehood. The common law was adopted thrice over in the 
formative days of the Indian Territory. First, the United States Congress passed the Or-
ganic Act of 1890, providing for a temporary government for the Oklahoma Territory.82 
Section 31 of the Organic Law stated that the “general laws of the State of Arkansas . . . 
as published . . . Mansfield’s Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas . . . are hereby extended 
over and put in force in the Indian Territory . . .”83 Explicitly included was “common and 
statute law of England, chapter twenty.”84 Mansfield’s Digest then provided: “The com-
mon law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature . . . shall be 
the rule of decision in this state unless altered or repealed by the general assembly of this 
state.”85 
Additionally, in 1893, the Territorial Legislature enacted St. 1893, § 3874, which 
provides in pertinent part: “The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory 
law, judicial decisions and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain inforce in 
aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma.”86 The language has remained the same to this 
day, now codified at 12 O.S. § 2. 
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held: 
when people from all parts of the United States, on the 22d day of April, 
1889, settled the country known as Oklahoma, built cities, towns, and 
villages, and began to carry on trade and commerce in all its various 
                                                          
 80. The “student” article was written by K. Keith Cressman and entitled The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in 
Oklahoma: Common Law Protection of Business from Unjustified Interference, OKLA. B. J., v. 56, No. 30, 1759-
1764 (1985).   
 81. Tarrant, 241 P.3d at 284. The only case citing Tarrant is Miller v. Johnson, 307 P.3d 387 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2013), which adopts this principle.  As discussed below, while the principle itself might be sound—no 
creation of a “new” tort except as recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court—the application here is improper, 
there is no need to adopt the tort as it has long existed in Oklahoma. 
 82. 26 U.S. STAT. AT LARGE, ch. 120.   
 83. 26 U.S. STAT. AT LARGE, ch.. 120, § 31; see also, Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Res. 
Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 572 (Okla. 1990). 
 84. Id. 
 85. W.W. MANSFIELD, A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, LITTLE ROCK: MITCHELL & BETTIS, 
SEAM BOOK AND JOB PRINTERS, 1884, ch. XX, § 566. 
 86. Quoted in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Yount, 1911 OK 480, 30 Okla. 371, 120 P. 627, 629.   
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branches, they brought into Oklahoma, with them, the established prin-
ciples and rules of the common law, as recognized and promulgated by 
the American courts, and as it existed when imported into this country 
by our early settlers, and unmodified by American or English statutes.87 
Thus, the question becomes whether prima facie tort was a part of the common law 
in the early 1890’s. The answer is not particularly clear. While Holmes’ The Common Law 
was published in 1881, Privilege, Malice, and Intent did not go to press until 1894—after 
the latest potential date of adoption. However, the primary cases on which Holmes relied, 
Walker v. Cronin and Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, were issued in 1871 and 1889, 
respectively. In addition, Pollack’s seminal paper was published in 1887, again, predating 
the Indian Territory adoption of the common law. To further complicate matters, one must 
appreciate that, prior to this formulation and the general shift in tort theory, “numerous 
decisions . . . had articulated the principle that the infliction of injury without justification 
as actionable”—a position potentially construed as imposing strict liability.88 Thus, to 
some degree, the prima facie tort, with its intent requirement, could be seen as narrowing 
the construction of the common law, without which courts would be required to impose 
strict liability on a much broader scale than most would find acceptable in today’s practice. 
This, however, appears to be a case where the proof is in the proverbial pudding, as 
Oklahoma courts have, in fact, repeatedly applied the prima facie tort doctrine.89 Thus, 
even if their precedential value is ignored, they provide evidence that the common law 
included the prima facie tort concept when adopted in Oklahoma. Indeed, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, in Hibbard v. Halliday, explicitly relied on the seminal case of Aikens v. 
Wisconsin, when it stated: “At common law there was a cause of action whenever one 
person did damage to another willfully and intentionally, and without just cause or ex-
cuse.”90 
V. THE PRIMA FACIE TORT IN MODERN COURTS 
While a significant number of jurisdictions have been identified as recognizing the 
prima facie tort doctrine,91 only three states have detailed recent case law on the topic. 
                                                          
 87. McKennon v. Winn, 33 P. 582, 585 (Okla. 1893). See also, Reaves v. Reaves, 82 P. 490, 494 (Okla. 1905) 
(“The canon and civil laws as they were administered in England were brought here by the early settlers of this 
country, and were regarded by them as parts of the common law, and have been adopted and used in all cases to 
which they were applicable, and whenever there have been conditions existing to call for their use. When it is 
conceded that these laws were a part of the common law of England, and were brought to this country by our 
ancestors, then it must follow that these laws have become, and are now, a part of the laws of Oklahoma.”); 
Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper Co., 873 P.2d 983, 996 (Okla. 1994) (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
 88. Vandevelde, supra note 7, at 477 (“If taken at face value, this principle created a general theory of strict 
liability. At least where the common law forms of action were in place, however, the scope of this principle was 
limited by the requirement that the plaintiff plead facts which would state a case of action in trespass or case.”).  
 89. Interestingly, a number of academic sources have identified Oklahoma as a jurisdiction recognizing the 
cause of action. Speiser et al, supra note 42, § 35:8; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort 
Doctrine, 79 Ky. L. J. 519, 526 (Spring 1990/1991). James P. Bieg, Prima Facie Tort Comes to New Mexico: A 
Summary of Prima Facie Tort Law, 21 N.M. L. Rev. 327, 343 (1991); 52 Colum. L. Rev. at 504.  
 90. 158 P. at 1159. 
 91. For example, Speiser, supra note 42, § 35:8 provides that “Courts deciding cases under the law of Ari-
zona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and the Virgin Islands 
have applied the prima facie tort doctrine either explicitly or by implication, or at least in arrow circumstances.” 
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New York has the most developed body of case law on prima facie tort. It also has the 
most restrictive version of the tort. “The requisite elements of a cause of action for prima 
facie tort are (1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) which results in special damages, 
(3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts which would other-
wise be lawful.”92 
Of chief importance is the requirement that “there is no recovery in prima facie tort 
unless malevolence is the sole motive for defendant’s otherwise lawful act or unless de-
fendant acts from disinterested malevolence.”93 Additionally, New York requires that there 
not be a traditional tort, which provides the remedy.94 
As described by one commentator, Missouri “examined the New York experience 
and the Restatement Second, Torts view and fashioned a prima facie tort doctrine that 
combined the fundamental policy view of the Restatement with the analytically consistent 
aspects of the New York experience.”95 Missouri has formulated the following require-
ments for its version of the tort: “The elements of a prima facie tort claim are: (1) an 
intentional lawful act by defendant; (2) defendant’s intent to injure the plaintiff; (3) injury 
to the plaintiff; and (4) an absence of or insufficient justification for defendant’s act.”96 
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held: “The theory of a prima facie 
tort is that a party intending to cause injury to another should be liable if the conduct is 
culpable and unjustifiable,” 97 espousing the following elements to establish the tort: 
The generally recognized elements of the tort are (1) an intentional and 
lawful act; (2) an intent to injure the plaintiff; (3) injury to the plaintiff 
as a result of the act; and (4) the absence of sufficient justification for 
the act. Our Supreme Court has emphasized that the tort is to be applied 
narrowly.98 
Importantly, both Missouri and New Mexico have rejected New York’s “disinter-
ested malevolence” requirement—that intent to harm be the sole motivation for the ac-
tion—in favor of the balancing approach of the Restatement regarding prima facie tort,99 
                                                          
 92. Miller v. Walters, 997 N.Y.S.2d 237, 246 (Sup. Ct. 2014), (quoting Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 
349 (1985)); Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1983).   
 93. Id. 
 94. See e.g., Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 355 (N.Y. 1985) (“[P]rima facie tort should not 
become a catch-all alternative for every cause of action which cannot stand on its own legs. Where relief may be 
afforded under traditional tort concepts, prima facie tort may not be invoked as a basis to sustain a pleading which 
otherwise fails to state a cause of action in conventional tort.”).  
 95. Speiser et al, supra note 42, § 35:7. 
 96. Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 315 (Mo. 1993) (citing Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. 
Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 
(Mo.App.1980); see also, Philips v. Citimortgage, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). 
 97. Saylor v. Valles, 63 P.3d 1152, 1159(N.M. 2003) (citing Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 734 
(N.M. 1990)); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rummel, 945 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1997). The New Mexico and Missouri ap-
proaches to prima facie torts have been described as “nearly identical.” James P. Bieg, Prima Facie Tort Comes 
to New Mexico: A Summary of Prima Facie Tort Law, 21 N.M. L. Rev. 327, 349 (1991).  
 98. Saylor, 63 P.3d at 1159. 
 99. Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 735; Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386, 405 (N.M. 1999) overruled on other 
grounds by Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181 (N.M. 2003); Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 315; LPP Mortgage, 
Ltd. v. Marcin, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
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that is, Missouri and New Mexico have applied § 870 with the additional New York re-
quirement that no other traditional tort remedy be available.100 
VI. CONCLUSION – APPLICATION OF THE PRIMA FACIE DOCTRINE IN OKLAHOMA 
Given the Court of Civil Appeal’s competing opinions and the lack of recent guid-
ance from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, application of the prima facie tort lies with those 
sharing the courtroom on a regular basis. There would seem to be very little rationale to 
reject the “prima facie tort” in modern practice. It is consistent with the broad principles 
of law that the courts apply every day across Oklahoma, the United States and other com-
mon law systems. The theory was originally developed to explain the commonalities 
shared by all intentional torts. Moreover, negligent torts follow a very similar pattern—
there are not statutes or cases purporting to comprehend all negligent acts. Rather, the trier 
of fact, in many circumstances, must weigh the conduct of the defendant and determine 
whether a duty exists. If it does, then the trier must determine whether the defendant 
breached that duty. Similarly, courts will grant equitable relief to correct certain wrongs 
that they cannot address otherwise. There is no hard and fast rule that defines the outer 
boundaries of equity. The same principles are at work with prima facie tort. Society simply 
does not condone conduct when the actor intends harm without good reason. At its core, 
that is exactly what we want our legal system to address. 
Oklahoma should look to its nearby sister states to the west and northeast for guid-
ance in applying the tort. After all, both New Mexico and Missouri have cited Oklahoma 
in their efforts to define the scope of the prima facie tort.101 Indeed, in Fulton, the Okla-
homa Court of Civil Appeals—without citing to either jurisdiction, essentially applied the 
same approach—looked to the Restatement position with the caveat that a more specific 
tort could not be available.102 Nonetheless, Oklahoma is sorely in need of an opinion from 
its highest court clarifying the current state of the prima facie tort. Until then, and in an 
effort to afford the Oklahoma Supreme Court the opportunity to render such guidance, 
each party involved in the litigation process should ensure the tort is properly applied. 
Plaintiff’s counsel, as the proponent of the tort’s application, bears the initial responsibility 
of ensuring the claim is only presented where there is a reasonable basis to conclude: (1) 
the act was committed intentionally and maliciously i.e., without sufficient justification; 
and (2) the facts fall outside the scope of existing remedies. Defense counsel must ensure 
that the elements of the tort are properly applied, with a significant focus on the reasons 
behind the defendant’s conduct given that the tort specifically allows for recovery even 
though the party might have some general right to act (total lack of justification would 
                                                          
 100. Bandag, 662 S.W.2d at 552 (“Having carefully considered the applicable precedents, we conclude that 
if, at the close of all the evidence, plaintiff’s proof warrants submission under an existing, well-defined nominate 
tort cause of action, the action may not be submitted under the prima facie tort doctrine.”); Bradley v. Lovelace 
Sandia Health Sys., No. 27,936, 2009 WL 6667452, at *3 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2009) (“Prima facie tort may 
be pled in the alternative, but if the district court determines that the facts of the case would be more properly 
submitted under an established tort, it must dismiss the claim.”).  See also, Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern 
Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 79 Ky. L. J. 519, 547 (Spring 1990/1991). 
 101. Bandag, 662 S.W.2d at 552; Schmitz, 785 P.2d at 734 (both discussing Mangum).   
 102. Fulton, 241 P.3d at 266-267; see also, Rollins, 2014 WL 1466487 at *2 (“Thus the Fulton court appears 
to have affirmed the viability of the tort of malicious wrong unless a more specific claim for intentional interfer-
ence with economic relations has been pled.”); Myers, 2011 WL 39039, at *2. 
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seem to arise only on the rarest of occasions). Courts, at both the trial and appellate levels 
should not permit unfettered expansion of the tort. They must, for example, be vigilant to 
reject the use of the tort merely as a means to evade the stringent requirements of other 
theories of recovery, particularly given that Justice Holmes originally derived the tort, at 
least in part, as a means to reign in judicial activism. Similar to equitable relief, courts 
should only present a prima facie tort theory to a jury where a more defined tort is not 
applicable. 
Oklahoma has historically recognized the existence of a tort for malicious wrong, 
although notably without using the term “prima facie tort.” If properly applied, the tort, 
regardless of the semantic designation, will continue to fill an important, albeit very lim-
ited, role in modern jurisprudence. 
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